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Wolfe: Wyoming's Government Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptio

COMMENTS
WYOMING'S GOVERNMENTAL CLAIMS ACT:
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WITH EXCEPTIONSA STATUTORY ANALYSIS
On July 1, 1979 the shackles of absolute governmental
immunity were cracked from the wrists of tort litigants
who had been injured by governmental action. On that date
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (GCA)1 inaugurated a new era of limited governmental liability. In
direct response to the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision
in Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners' the 45th Wyoming Legislature enacted the GCA in order to "balance the
respective equities between persons injured by governmental
action and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose
revenues are utilized by governmental entities on behalf
of those taxpayers."'
As Chief Justice Guthrie noted in Oroz,' the area of
governmental and sovereign immunity has been exhaustively discussed. This article will not attempt to add, except
briefly, to the voluminous literature which dissects the
intricacies of governmental immunity.' Rather, the comment
will focus upon the GCA, analyze its significant provisions,
recommend several necessary changes, and come to conclusions as to the extent to which the legislature succeeded in
"balancing the respective equities."6
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-101 through § 1-39-119 and § 26-3-128.1 (Supp. 1979).
2. 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978). Oroz abrogated the governmental immunity
of local governments.
3. Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-102(a) (Supp. 1979).
4. Supra note 2, at 1157.
5. The best starting point is the excellent discussion by Prof. Minge. Minge,
Government Immunity From Damage Actions in Wyoming, 7 LAND &
WATER L. REv. (Part 1-229, Part 11-617) (1972). See also Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, 14 LAND & WATER L. REv. 271 (1979); Jivelekas v.
City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976) (Justice Rose opinion).
6. The vocabulary in this area of the law is confusing. In Worthinton v.
State, 598 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1979), retired Chief Justice Guthrie distinguished
between sovereign immunity, which applies to the state, and governmental
immunity which applies to all local governments. Other courts have defined
governmental immunity as applying to the general immunity from torts
enjoyed by both the state and local governments, and sovereign immunity
as limited to the states immunity from suit without its consent. Holytz v.
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962); see Note,
supra note 5, at 271-272. The different labels are not helpful and obviously
the legislature did not adopt Justice Guthrie's distinctions since the GCA
applies to all governments. In this comment the generic term governmental
immunity will be used except where differentiation is essential.
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In the early 1970's the doctrine of governmental immunity came under increasingly hostile attack by the courts
and the commentators.' The initial salvos in Wyoming were
fired by Professor Minge in his two penetrating articles.'
Minge noted that Wyoming governments have historically
enjoyed a broad grant of immunity from tort actions.'
However, beginning in 1974 the Wyoming Supreme Court
turned an increasingly unfriendly eye upon this immunity."
Although the court continued, until Oroz," to uphold immunity, it was faced with strong and scholarly opposition
by Mr. Justice Rose.' 2 In addition, three years prior to
Oroz," Mr. Chief Justice Raper in Awe v. The University
of Wyoming" indicated his belief that the legislature should
act to set up some "uniform system of handling state tort
liability."'"
The 44th Wyoming Legislature, aware of the imminent
demise of governmental immunity, passed in 1977 a Wyoming Tort Claims Act.'" However, the act was vetoed by the
Governor. In 1978 Oroz held that "immunity from tort
liability, heretofore judicially conferred upon counties
(municipal corporations, school districts, and other subdivisions of government) is abrogated." 7 Oroz did not
reach the issue of the state's immunity, 8 although the concurring opinions by Justices Raper and Rose cast doubt
upon the continuing viability of the doctrine." The Oroz
decision made the abolition of immunity prospective and
7.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES supplementing
ISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 25.00 et. seq. (1976 and 1980).

ADMIN-

8. Minge, supra note 5.
9. Id. at 235.
10. Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1344
(Wyo. 1974).
11. Supra note 2.
12. Jivelekas v. City of Worland, supra note 5.
13. Supra note 2.
14. 534 P.2d 97, 106-107 (Wyo. 1975).
15. Id.
16. House Bill No. 186, Wyoming State Legislature, 1977 Session. See reference
to the act in Oroz, supra note 2, at 1160 (Justice Raper, concurring).
17. Supra note 2, at 1158.
18. Id. at 1158 n. 6.
19. Id. at 1159-1161.
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except for the claim of Mr. Oroz,2 °'local government liability
became the rule as to all claims arising on or after July 1,
1979. The Governmental Claims Act was passed on March
6, 1979 and made effective on July 1, 1979.21
Before analyzing the GCA, note must be made of the
Wyoming Supreme Court's position as to recovery for
injuries caused by the state that arose prior to July 1, 1979.
In Worthington v. State2 - the court was faced with claims
against the state for injuries that had occurred in separate
automobile accidents in 1976 and 1977.2' The court addressed
squarely the plaintiffs' argument that the court should
abrogate immunity as it applies to the State of Wyoming.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' position and held that
"the defense of sovereign immunity was available to protect defendants (State of Wyoming, State Highway Commission, and Department of Revenue and Taxation) from
suit. .. " The court's decision was based upon the long
established interpretation of article 1, section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, that provides that the State of Wyoming
is not subject to suit without it's consent. 5 Since there was
no consent in this case the state's immunity from suit was
a complete shield.
It is clear from the Worthington" opinion that the
court will defer to the legislature's actions in establishing
a uniform system for handling tort claims. As retired Chief
Justice Guthrie stated,
20. The final chapter in Mr. Oroz's landmark suit is recorded in Oroz v. Hayes,
598 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1979).
21. 1979 Wyo. SEss. LAws. Ch. 157, § 8.
22. 598 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1979).
23. Worthington is a complex case. The court held that the injuries suffered
by the plaintiffs were not within the risks contemplated by the insurance
contract between the defendant insurer (State Farm) and the State of
Wyoming. Id. at 809. Because the risks were not covered by the insurance
contract the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the protection of
WYO. STAT. § 1-35 102 (1977) which waives governmental immunity to
the extent of liability coverage. Since the immunity was not waived the
plaintiffs had to attack the doctrine directly and without success.
24. Worthington v. State, supra note 22, at 805.
25. WYO. CONST. art. I § 8 states:
All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done
to person, reputation or property shall have justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may
by law direct. (Emphasis added.)
26. Supra note 22.
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[T]his matter can be far better handled by a
legislature to carve out and classify those areas in
which the doctrine of immunity shall be abolished
and those areas in which it should be retained. If
this is not left in the hand of the legislature, this
court would be forced to settle the possible areas
in which the doctrine should not apply on a caseby-case basis with unnecessary confusion and expense to litigants and the State."
Although the constitutional argument in Worthington is not
above criticism,28 the holding in the case is certain. The
court will let the legislature, through the GCA, establish
a system for handling injuries caused by governmental
action. The court will uphold the July 1, 1979 beginning
date and all causes of action resulting from injuries occurring prior to that date should be barred by the continued
validity of governmental immunity.
THE GOVERNMENTAL CLAIMS ACT-AN OVERVIEW

In attempting to devise a uniform system for handling
tort claims the legislature was assisted in its decisionmaking by a wealth of information from other states and
an able Legislative Service Office.2" By 1978, at least 36
states had adopted or were considering some form of
governmental tort law. 0
The legislature's first decision was whether to enact
a "close-ended" or "open-ended" statutory scheme. A "closeended" approach reasserts governmental immunity but
27. Id. at 805.
28. Id. at 809 (J. Rose, dissenting opinion). See Note, supra note 5.
29. The author is grateful for the assistance of Mr. Joseph B. Meyer and
Mr. T. Thomas Singer of the Legislative Service Office who kindly made
the legislative committee materials available.
30. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES 6, The New World of Municipal Liability,
(April, 1978). A copy of this comprehensive document, which contains a
state-by-state survey of the status of governmental immunity was distributed to the members of the Subcommittee to Study Sovereign Immunity
of the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee. Letter of August 7, 1978 from
Joseph B. Meyer to subcommittee members. For a more recent state
survey see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEY GENERALS. Sovereign
Immunity: The Tort Liability of Government and Its Officials (September 1979). For a slightly dated state-by-state survey see Harely and
Wasinger, Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle of Creature of Necessity, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 12 (1976). Note, their analysis of the status of
governmental immunity in Wyoming is incorrect.
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waives the immunity for certain enumerated exceptions.
Such an approach has been taken by Colorado,"1 New
Mexico8 2 and Maine"a among others. In contrast, the majority
of states have passed "open-ended" legislation 4 that makes
liability the rule and retains immunity only for certain
categories of activities." The Federal Tort Claims Act is
"open-ended." 8
The Wyoming legislature chose a "close-ended" approach, based on the advice of the Attorney General," and
also probably in the belief that such a statute retains
greater immunity for the government. The reassertion of
immunity is set forth in Section 1-39-104(a): "A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within
the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for
any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through
1-39-112."" 8 An important practical note is that the GCA
is similar to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 8 9 and decisions from that state should be consulted to interpret like
provisions of the GCA.
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-101 et. seq. (1973).
32. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 et. seq. (1978).
33. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101 et. seq.
34. The New World of Municipal Liability, supra note 30, at 7. In 1978, 24
of 36 states had open-ended statutes.
35. See, Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 30.260 to 30.300 (1977); California,
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810 et. seq. (West 1966); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41.031 to 41.039 (1973).
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671 et. seq.
(1970).
37. Op. Wyo. ATT'Y GEN. No. 79-003, Jan. 30, 1979, p.9. "In the event the
legislature shall desire to authorize suits for specific causes of action or
to limit the amount of recovery, the quoted provisions of the Constitution
(ART. 10, § 4, ART. 1, § 8) compel the legislation to first establish the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and thereafter to waive the doctrine to the
extent legislatively determined."
38. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) (Supp. 1979).
39. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2, § 41-4-3 (1978) (definitions of "public
employee and "scope of duties") and the exceptions in §§ 41-4-5 through
41-4-12 with Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-39-102, 1-39-103 and exceptions §§ 1-39-105
through 1-39-112 (Supp. 1979). The exceptions to immunity in both statutes
are practically identical. Note, however, changes in N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-4-4, 41-4-10 (Supp. 1979). See also Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and
Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M. L. REV. 249 (1976); see
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 603 P.2d 303 (N.M.App. 1979) (this case
arose prior to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act); McClure v. Town of
Mesilla, 601 P.2d 80 (N.M.App. 1979). Candelaria v. Robinson, 606 P.2d
196 (N.M.App. 1980); City of Albuquerque v. Redding, 605 P.2d 1156
(N.M. 1980). The Wyoming legislative subcommittee, supra, note 30, considered a bill patterned after the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Letter
from Joseph B. Meyer, Legislative Service Office to Rep. Ross Copenhaver,
March 22, 1978.
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From a procedural standpoint, jurisdiction for claims
under the GCA is vested in the district courts of Wyoming.40
Venue is expansive, as claims against the state can be
brought in the county in which the public employee resides,
the county in which the cause of action arose or in Laramie
County." The definition of "governmental entity"" and
the corresponding definitions of "state"43 and "local government ' 14 appear to cover every conceivable governmental
organization. The GCA also provides that it is the exclusive
remedy against a governmental entity and that no other
claims against the government arising out of the same
transaction may be brought."
The GCA does not directly address the article I section
846 constitutional requirement that the state give its consent
to suit. Nowhere in the act does it say that the state thereby
consents to suit. However, the language "the governmental
entity is liable"4 7 would certainly be interpreted by all laymen and most lawyers as constituting permission to sue
the state.
Constitutionality of the GCA
The GCA should pass constitutional muster under both
the state and United States Constitution. The act would
survive a challenge based on the state constitution. Wyoming Constitution article 1, section 848 gives the legislature
the power to determine the manner in which suits may be
brought against the state. The Wyoming Court's interpretation of this constitutional provision in Worthington"
strongly supports the power of the legislature to enact the
GCA. 0 Additionally, the recent decisions by the court have
§ 1-39-117 (a) (Supp. 1979).
§ 1-39-117(b) (Supp. 1979).
§ 1-39-103 (a) (i) (Supp. 1979).
§ 1-39-103 (a) (v) (Supp. 1979).
§ 1-39-103(a) (ii) (Supp. 1979).
§ 1-39-116 (Supp. 1979); see McClure v. Town of Mesilla,
supra note 39, for a discussion of the meaning of the exclusive remedy
provision.
Supra note 25.
WYO. STAT. § 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 (Supp. 1979).
Supra note 25.
Supra note 22.
Also, the Attorney General's opinion, supra note 37, concludes that the
act would be constitutional.

40. WYO. STAT.
41. WYO. STAT.
42. Wyo. STAT.
43. WYO. STAT.
44. WYo. STAT.
45. WYo. STAT.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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demonstrated a desire of the Justices to place the burden
of enacting a uniform system for handling tort claims upon
the legislature. 5 Finally, constitutional challenges have been
raised against tort claims acts in other states and the statutes have been uniformly upheld.2
State tort claims acts have also been challenged under
the United States Constitution, primarily on fourteenth
amendment due process and equal protection grounds. These
challenges have been mostly unsuccessful. In a recent United
5 the
States Supreme Court decision, Martinez v. California,"
court upheld a California statute that grants absolute immunity to state employees who make parole release decisions.
The court rejected the plaintiff's due process claims and held
that there was a rational relationship between the states
purpose of protecting the exercise of the parole officer's
discretion and the statutory immunity. The court stated
that "the State's interest in fashioning its own rules of
tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest."5
Using similar reasoning, several state courts have
upheld their tort claim statutes against equal protection
challenges." Also, the statutory limitation on the amount
of recovery ($500,000 under the GCA) has survived constitutional attack,56 and such limitations are now an accepted
feature of governmental claims acts. 7 In summary, the GCA
should survive a constitutional assault.
51. Worthington v. State, supra note 22; Oroz v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
supra note 2; Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra note 14.
52. Silva v. State, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1970) ; Fritz v. Regents of the
University of Colorado, 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978); White v. Detroit, 254
N.W.2d 572 (Mich. App. 1977); Datil v. City of California, 263 Cal.
App.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968).
53 ......... U.S -......., 100 S.Ct. 553 (1980). Note that this is a rare unanimous
decision.
54. Id. at 554.
55. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978) ; Fritz v. Regents of University
of Colorado, supra note 52; Datil v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 52;
Silva v. State, supra note 52; Est. of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406
A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979), app. dismissed.
56. Torres v. State, 372 N.E.2d 445, ([11. App. 1978), app. dismissed 99 S.Ct.
270 (1978), upholding Illinois' $25,000 recovery limit. See also Silva v.
State, supra note 52, at 594; 48 U.S. L.W. 3596 (1980).
57. See City of Colorado Springs v. Gladin, 599 P.2d 909 (Colo. 1979). Undoubtedly, a Wyoming plaintiff will attack the constitutionality of the
limit on recovery. The argument will probably be based on article 10,
§ 1 of the Wyoming Constitution which provides: "No law shall be
enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the
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Liability-Making the Case Against the Government
In order to recover against the governmental entity
the plaintiff will have to meet all of the statutory requirements and survive all defenses. As the California Supreme
Court has stated in interpreting California's Tort Claims
Act:
"The intent of the act is not to expand the rights of
plaintiff's in suits against governmental entities,
but to confine potential governmental liability
to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is
waived only if the various requirements of the
act are satisfied.""8
To be successful, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the
suit is a tort action; (2) that the claim falls within one
of the enumerated exceptions; (3) that the negligence (4)
of a public employee (5) while acting within the scope of
his duties (6) caused bodily injury, wrongful death, or
property damage. These requirements will be discussed in
order.
Tort Action
In interpreting the GCA it is important to remember
the general rule that statutes in derogation of state sovereignty are to be strictly construed. Therefore, it can be
expected that Wyoming courts will require that actions
brought under the GCA fit comfortably within its intended
scope. The threshold requirement in these suits is that they
injury or death of any person. . . ." This argument should not succeed.
The Attorney General concludes in Opinion No. 79-003, 8upra note 37,
that such a limitation is constitutionally permissible. In summary, the
Attorney General's conclusion is based on two propositions: 1. "If the
power exists to perform an act the power exists to perform part of an
act." The legislature has the power to grant partial immunity. 2. The
provision in WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4, was not intended to be applied to
the state or its political subdivisions.
58. Williams v. Horvath, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125 (1976). Note in
contrast the statement of the Nevada Supreme Court in Hagblom v. State
Div. of Motor Vehicles, 571 P.2d 1172, 1174-1175 (Nev. 1977). Nevada
has an open-ended statute that waives immunity, supra note 35. The
court stated, "We are mindful that '[i]n a close case we must favor a
waiver of immunity and accommodate the legislative scheme.'" citing
Silva v. State, supra note 52, at 593.
59. Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397
(1947); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971).
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must be "tort" actions." Section 1-39-104(q) grants immunity for "any tort".61 Unfortunately, tort is not defined
by the statute. This lack of definition is characteristic of
many state tort claims acts. 2 The legislature must have intended that common-law notions of "tort" prevail. In Wyoming, "tort" has a very broad meaning,6 3 so suits that make
a colorable claim of being "tort" actions should be brought
under the umbrella of the GCA. As is discussed in greater
detail below, a determination that a suit is a tort action and
therefore proper under the GCA can have a significant
impact upon such rights as indemnification, the notice of
claim period and the statute of limitations." Undoubtedly,
some of the initial battles involving the GCA will turn on
the interpretation of the word "tort".
The Exceptions to Immunity
The enumerated exceptions to immunity in sections
1-39-105 through 1-39-111 of the Wyoming Statutes make
the governmental entity liable for damages resulting from
bodily injury, wrongful death, and property damage caused
by the negligence of public employees while acting within
the scope of their duties. Section 1-39-112" provides for
more expansive liability resulting from a law enforcement
60. The GCA does not address immunity from contract actions. The state has
historically been immune from contract actions based on the Wyo. CONST.
art. 1 § 8 argument that the state may not be sued without its consent.
Hjroth Royalty Comp. v. Trustees of University, 30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9
(1924). The Wyoming Court recently reaffirmed the state's immunity
from contract actions when the state is engaging in a governmental function. Biscar v. University of Wyoming Board of Trustees, 605 P.2d 374
(Wyo. 1980). However, the issue is now moot. The 1980 Wyoming Legislature amended Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) (Supp. 1979) to waive the
immunity of a governmental entity to actions based on a contract. 1980
Wyo. SEss. LAws. Ch. 46.
61. Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) (Supp. 1979).
62. See, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 et. seq. (1978); MONT. STAT. ANN. § 2-9-101
et. seq. (1979).
63. "Generally tort has a meaning somewhat similar to "wrong" and is an
unlawful act injurious to another independent of contract and the injury
may be either by non-feasance, malfeasance, or misfeasance. Price v. State
Highway Com'n 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (1946). The definition of
tort will also be a central point of conflict in suits brought under the
civil rights acts, especially 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Suits under § 1983
may not be couched in terms of traditional torts and because the GCA
requires the government to indemnify employees only for "tort claims",
the definition of tort becomes crucial. See the discussion accompanying
notes 117-129.
64. See the discussion accompanying notes 117-139 infra.
65. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-39-105 through 111 (Supp. 1979).
66. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-112(Supp. 1979).
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officer's acts and this section will be addressed later in
this comment.
The enumerated exceptions cover the following activities:
Sec. 105Sec. 106Sec. 107 Sec. 108Sec. 109 Sec. 110 Sec. 111 Sec. 112

-

Operation of motor vehicles, aircraft
and water craft.
Operation and maintenance of buildings, recreation areas and public parks.
Operation of airports.
Operation of public utilities and services (but no liability for failure to
provide services).
Operation of any public hospital or in
providing public outpatient health care.
Health care providers
Operation or maintenance of public
facilities.
Law enforcement officers.

The exceptions are not very specific, which is probably
intentional since the act is designed to cover the great
majority of circumstances in which the activities of public
employees can create a risk of physical harm to the public.
Note that the exceptions make the governmental entity
liable in those situations where the government is acting
most like a private individual. These exceptions are analogous to the activities that court's have labeled as proprietary and governments have historically been liable for
such actions. 7 The strength of the GCA and the closeended approach to liability is that it avoids the uncertain
and result-oriented justice that prevails when courts must
grapple with the imprecision of the governmental/proprietary distinction. 8 The enumerated exceptions set forth the
areas of liability clearly and the government should be immune from actions that fall outside the exceptions.
An interesting question is raised by section 1-39-111,69
liability for public facilities. This section probably covers
67. Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152 (1957).
68. One commentator calls the distinction "probably one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law." DAVIs, supra note 7, § 25.07 (Supp. 1976).
69. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-111 (Supp. 1979).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/8

10

Wolfe: Wyoming's Government Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity with Exceptio

1980

COMMENTS

629

highways, bridges, parking lots, and the like but what else
should be included in the term "public facilities" is uncertain.
The comparable New Mexico statute deals with highways
and streets, and also makes the state immune from liability
for defects in design or plan or from the failure to construct or reconstruct." The Wyoming section's limitation
to "operation and maintenance" would seem to preclude an
action for defective design but the issue will certainly be
litigated.
Section 1-39-112, the law enforcement exception provides: "A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers
while acting within the scope of their duties". 1 This section
exposes the governmental entity to broader liability than
the other exceptions. The section permits the government to
be liable for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation and
perhaps deprivation of civil rights, to name a few. While
such broad liability is probably desirable in order to
adequately protect the public against police tyranny, the
statute has some troubling aspects. Note the term "law
enforcement officer" is undefined. The legislature could
have borrowed the definition of "peace officer" from section
9-14-101"5 of the Wyoming Statutes. That section limits the
term to full-time, fully compensated officers.
By not using the term "peace officer" the legislature
may have intended to subject other public employees, who
are not traditionally identified as peace officers but who
have law enforcement duties, to the statute's broad liability.
But where the definitional lines should be drawn is unclear.
For example, parole officers, parking meter attendants, dog
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-11 (B) (1978). See City of Albuquerque v. Redding,
supra note 39.
71. Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-112 (Supp. 1979).
72. WYO. STAT. § 9-14-110 (1977). Note the definition in the New Mexico
statutes. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(D) (1978), "law enforcement officer"
means "any full-time salaried public employee of a governmental entity
whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody any person
accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or to make arrests
for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty
by the governor." See Candelaria v. Robinson, supra note 39.
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catchers, national guardsmen, the attorney general, and
OSHA compliance officers have law enforcement duties and
therefore may fall within the definition. Because the potential liability for the actions of law enforcement officers is
enormous, the legislature should draw some clear lines at
its earliest opportunity to deliniate the kinds of employees
who are to be included within the term.7"
Negligence
The GCA establishes a negligence standard.74 The
legislature specifically provided that the act does not allow
the imposition of strict liability." The legislature could have
used language such as that found in the New Mexico statute
that states: "liability for acts or omissions under the Tort
Claims Act shall be based upon the traditional tort concepts
of duty and the reasonably prudent person's standard of
care in the performance of that duty."- 6 However, such
language is arguably superfluous and its absence from the
GCA is probably without significance. The enumerated
exceptions are based upon the negligence of the public
employee and therefore, plaintiff's suing under the GCA
will be required to make the traditional showing of duty,
breach, proximate cause and damage."
Public Employee
Section 1-39-103 (a) (iii) defines public employee as:
any officer, employee or servant of a governmental
entity, including elected or appointed officials, law
enforcement officers and persons acting on behalf
or in service of a governmental entity in any official
capacity, whether with or without compensation,
but the term does not include an independent con73. Until the legislature acts, courts may get some small assistance from
State v. Mclain, 224 Kan. 464, 580 P.2d 1334 (1978) and State v: Padilla,
91 N.M. 451, 575 P.2d 960 (1978). See also 24A WORDS AND PHRASES
"Law Enforcement Officer" (1966 and Supp.).
74. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-105 through 111 (Supp. 1979) are all phrased to make
the governmental entity liable for damages . . . "caused by the negligence
of public employees."
75. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-102(b) (Supp. 1979).
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(B) (1978).
77. PROSSER, TORTS § 28 et. seq. (4th ed. 1971).
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tractor or a judicial officer exercising the authority
vested in him.78
The definition is very broad and would appear to cover
almost any person acting in the service of the government.
The issue should be very infrequently litigated with the
possible exception of the independent contractor status.
Because the GCA is phrased in terms of the "negligence of the public employee", it is essential that the plaintiff name the responsible public official as a defendant. It
may often be difficult to identify the proper public employee.
For example, in Oroz,7 ' the plaintiff sued the Board of
County Commissioners. While the Board is the appropriate
governmental entity, the commissioners are not the public
employees whose negligence caused the injury. In such a
case, the plaintiff should name the county road and bridge
supervisor as a defendant. The plaintiff will then have to
prove that it was within the defendant supervisor's scope
of duties to maintain the roadway.8"
Scope of Duties
Under the definitions in the GCA, "scope of duties"
means: "performing any duties which a governmental
entity requests, requires or authorizes a public employee to
perform regardless of the time and place of performance."'"
As with "public employee," this definition is very
broad. The key factors are whether the governmental entity
"requests, requires or authorizes" the performance of the
duties. For example, the individual defendants in Price v.
State Highway Commission were held to be immune because
their acts were within their "official authority and in line
WYO. STAT. § 1-39-103(a) (iii) (Supp. 1979).
79. Supra note 2.
80. See, Annot., Validity and Construction of Statute Authorizing or Requiring
Governmental Unit to Procure Liability Insurance Covering Public Officers
or Employees for Liability Arising Out of Perfornance of Public Duties,
71 A.L.R.3d 6 (1976). In § 2(b) the annotation advises the plaintiff to
join as a defendant anyone possibly connected with the injury-causing
event.
78.

81. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-103(a) (iv)

(Supp. 1979).
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with their official duty."82 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
has stated in a case in which it was determined that a city
manager's fraud was not within the scope of his employment that:
"Course of employment" like "scope of authority"
is not capable of precise definition. It is largely a
question of fact. However, one is not in the course
of employment unless the conduct in controversy is
of the same general nature as that authorized or
incidental to the conduct authorized. 8
It can be expected that the Wyoming courts will examine
closely the relationship between the employees' actions and
the governmental duties that motivate that action.
The GCA appears to require that the plaintiff plead
and prove that the defendant employee was acting within
the scope of his duties. In many cases, where the scope of
the duties is clear, the proof should not be difficult and
may even be conceded by the governmental entity. However,
if the governmental entity determines that the employee
was acting outside the scope of his duties, the government
will seek to have itself dismissed from the law suit. In such
a case, the employee may cross-claim against the governmental entity and the issue will be litigated. In a suit
involving a law enforcement officer under section 1-39-112," '
because of the expansive liability, the government will be
strongly pressured to seek to prove that the officer's actions
were outside the scope of his duties. Such suits will be
difficult because they will pit the government against the
employee. This tension between the employee and the governmental entity seems to destroy one of the purposes of
82. Supra note 63, at 313. See also Osborn v. Lawson, 374 P.2d 201, 203 (Wyo.
1962).
83. Stull v. City of Tucumeari, 88 N.M. 320, 540 P.2d 250, 252 (1975). For an
extensive discussion of this requirement see Lang v. Cruz, 74 N.M. 473,
394 P.2d 988 (1964). See also 2 MECHEM, OUTLINES AGENCY, § 365 et. seq.
(4th Ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 229 (1958). An
excellent discussion is found in Annot., Validity and Construction of Statute
Authorizing or Requiring Governmental Unit to Indemnify Public Officer
or Employee for Liability Arising Out of Performance of Public Duties,
71 A.L.R.3d 90, § 23 (1976). See Candelaria v. Robinson, supra note 39,
(discussion of scope of duties of a district attorney).
84. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-112 (Supp. 1979).
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the GCA, which is to place the burden of liability upon the
government rather than the employee. However, these circumstances are perhaps unavoidable given the structure
of the statute, which vests in the determination of the scope
of duties the government's obligation to defend and indemnify the employee.
Bodily Injury, Wrongful Death and Property Damage
The enumerated exceptions require that the negligence
of the public employee cause bodily injury, wrongful death
or property damage. This limitation to physical injury
would seem to preclude recovery for personal injury
such as defamation, libel, slander, embarrassment or humiliation. As is discussed below this limitation cannot be applied
to restrict the rights of plaintiff's suing under Section 1983
of the federal civil rights act.8"
Defenses
The GCA preserves to the governmental entity all
common law defenses.86 It can be expected that the governmental entity will assert any tort defenses that may be
available.
In addition to common law defenses, plaintiffs suing
local governments may have to hurdle the familiar, yet
troublesome defenses embodied in the governmental/proprietary and discretionary/ministerial distinctions. The pertinent language is:
In the case of the state, this act abolishes all judicially created categories such as "governmental" or
"proprietary" functions and "discretionary" or
"ministerial" acts previously used by the courts
to determine immunity or liability. [Emphasis
added.]"
Oroz88 abolished any defenses based on these distinctions when it held local governments to the "same rules as
85. See text accompanying notes 107-130.
86. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-102(a) (Supp. 1979).
87. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-102(b) (Supp. 1979).
88. Supra note 2.
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private persons or corporations if a duty has been violated
and a tort has been committed."8 This section is subject to
two contrary interpretations. First, section 1-39-102 (b)"
could be interpreted to be recognition of the Oroz result
and an extension of Oroz to the state. Such an interpretation is consistent with the overall scheme of the GCA which
is to create a uniform system for handling tort claims and
to make liability dependent upon traditional negligence
concepts.
Alternatively, the section could be interpreted to be an
attempt by the legislature to reverse Oroz and reestablish
the validity of defenses based on these categories. The
critical words are "in the case of the state"." The difficulty
is that in construing statutes effect must be given to every
word, clause and sentence.92 If the legislature had intended
to abolish the categories as applied to all governmental
entities the offending phrase could have been deleted, as
New Mexico did in its statute.
From a practical standpoint if the legislature has
resurrected these categories from the graveyard of legal
anachronisms the impact upon plaintiffs suing local governments is tremendous. Under the law as it stood prior to
Oroz, plaintiffs were required to plead and prove whether
the negligence of the local government was committed in
the performance of governmental or proprietary functions."8
If the legislature has reinstated these requirements, then
plaintiffs may be faced with the anomalous result of being
able to prove liability under the GCA, but being denied
recovery because the government was acting in a discretionary or governmental function.
Hopefully, the statute will be interpreted by the courts
as merely extending the Oroz result to the state. Because
89. Id. at 1158.
90. WYO. STAT. § 1-39 102(b) (Supp. 1979).
91. "State" is defined by Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-103(a) (v) (Supp. 1979) to mean
the "state of Wyoming or any of its branches, agencies, departments,
boards, instrumentalities or institutions."
92. Basin Electric Power Co-operative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d
557, 566 (Wyo. 1978).
93. Savage v. Town of Lander, supra note 67.
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local government immunity is a court-made rule, the courts
could decide that the categories are no longer meaningful. 4
Such an action by the Wyoming courts would be in keeping
with the whole intent of the GCA. It is incongruous that a
comprehensive act such as the GCA, which seeks to create
a uniform system for managing tort claims, should retain
such anachronistic, uncertain, and unfair defenses. The
legislature should rectify this statutory problem, but until
the legislature acts, Wyoming courts would better effectuate the purpose of the GCA by declining to uphold the
validity of these categories.
Public Employee Liability
From the public employee's standpoint, the most important section of the GCA is section 1-39-104.11 That section
provides:
(a) A governmental entity and its public employees
while acting within the scope of duties are granted
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112.
(b) When liability is alleged against any public
employee, if the governmental entity determines he
was acting within the scope of his duty, whether
or not alleged to have been committed maliciously
or fraudulently, the governmental entity shall provide a defense at its expense. A governmental
entity shall save harmless, and indemnify its public
employees against any tort claim or judgment
arising out of an act or omission occurring within
the scope of their duties.
The law governing the liability of public employees is
complex and confused and recent United States Supreme
Court decisions on civil rights and constitutional torts have
only contributed to the uncertainty. 6 Although the GCA
94. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court's opinion in Biscar, supra note 60,
indicates that the governmental/proprietary distinction is still valid, at
least as applied to the states: contractual immunity.
95. Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-104 (Supp. 1979).
96. See the excellent critique in DAVIS, supra note 7, § 26.00 et. seq. (Supp.
1976 and 1980). See also Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: an Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 526 (1977) ;
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appears on its face to establish clear rules for determining
liability, that is, absolute immunity unless the action is
within one of the exceptions, this clarity is illusory. In order
to analyze the public employees' liability it is instructive
to break down public employee immunity into three categories: (1) No immunity-negligence, (2) absolute immunity,
and (3) qualified immunity.
(1) No immunity-negligence
If the suit is brought under one of the enumerated
exceptions in section 1-39-105 through 112,"7 the employee
has no immunity and any defenses are grounded in the law
of negligence. This lack of immunity should not be surprizing, since most public employees would probably agree
that they should not be treated differently from other individuals for injuries caused by such activities as driving a
car, piloting an airplane, or maintaining a building or street.
Although the employee has no immunity he is not
personally liable as long as the activity was within the
scope of his duties. Section 1-39-104 (b) 98 obligates the
governmental entity, to provide a defense and indemnify
the employee for any tort claim or judgment.
(2) Absolute immunity
If the claim is not within the enumerated exceptions
of the GCA and does not claim a civil rights or constitutional violation the employee and therefore the government
should be absolutely immune from liability. This immunity
is designed to cover the day-to-day administrative and policy
making functions of the government. Note how the GCA's
approach differs from the open-ended statutory scheme
enacted by Oregon.9" In Oregon liability is the rule, but
public employees and governments are protected by a discretionary functions exception that creates immunity for
Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 CoL. L.
REV. 1175 (1977).

97. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-105 through 112 (Supp. 1979).
98. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(b) (Supp. 1979).
99. Supra note 35.
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all discretionary acts.1"' The vice of this approach is the
use of the imprecise term "discretionary", which leads to
uncertainty and promotes result-oriented justice. If the
court wants to find the employee immune, all it must do
is label the employee's acts discretionary.10 '
The GCA avoids this problem by reasserting governmental immunity. Some states,'01 which have close-ended
statutes, still enacted long descriptions of activities for
which the employee retained immunity. Such lists are superfluous in a statutory scheme like the GCA. A public employee in Wyoming whose scope of duties are legislative
or quasi-legislative (e.g. adopting or failing to adopt
charters, ordinances, rules, regulations) or judicial or
quasi-judicial (e.g. granting, refusing to grant, or revoking,
a permit, order, license or any other administrative action)
has immunity for these acts as long as there has been no
civil rights or constitutional violation. For example, assume
an inspector for the State Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) detects a pollution source, investigates and
as a result, the DEQ Administrator issues a cease and
desist order.' Both public employees should be absolutely
immune from a claim of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, or even trespass. This immunity is based on the
fact that such claims do not fit within the enumerated
exceptions, and that the violator's remedies are administrative.' This immunity effectuates the policies that the public
interest is served by the fearless administration of the laws
and that a public employee should not be subject to liability
for action taken on behalf of the government. As the United
States Supreme Court has stated:
100. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265(3) (c) (1977).

101. See Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Ore. 1979). Dickens v.
DeBolt, 602 P.2d 246 (Ore. 1979). For a recent case interpreting the
"discretionary function" exemption under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
see Bernitsey v. U.S., 48 U.S.L.W. 2643 (3rd Cir. 1980).
102. Supra, note 33, § 8103(2).
103. The statutory authority for this action is found in WYO. STAT. § 35-11-109
(a) (vi) & (vii) and § 35-11-701(a) and (b) (1977). A question that could
be asked on the facts of this hypothetical is whether the employees are
law enforcement officers. See text accompanying note 72 eupra.
104. See discussion at notes 71-73 supra. See also the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act, WYo. STAT. § 9-4-104 et. seq. (1977). Note the recent New
Mexico case of Candelaria v. Robinson, supra note 39, where a county
prosecutor was held to have immunity from a defamation suit under New
Mexico's Tort Claims Act.
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Implicit in the idea that officials have some
immunity ... absolute or qualified . .. for their
acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to
assume that it is better to risk some error and
possible injury from such error than not to decide
or act at all. 105
Although the immunity should protect the public employee from liability, section 1-39-104 (b) "' obligates the
government to provide a defense and indemnify the employee from any tort claim or judgment.
(3)

Qualified immunity Torts.

Section 1983 and Constitutional

The GCA provides significant protection to public
employees who are sued in traditional tort actions. However, in the last decade perhaps the most common actions
against public employees have been suits brought under
42 U.S.C. section 1983.107 It is beyond the scope of this
comment to consider in detail the liability of public employees under section 1983.210 However, the GCA, either by
design or over-sight, provides no protection to public employees, other than law enforcement officers, from section
1983 actions. The potential exposure of public officials to
liability under section 1983 is substantial and a brief
discussion of this issue with suggestions for legislative
action is essential.
105. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974).
106. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-104(b) (Supp. 1979).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See in Wyoming, Bertot v. School District No. 1, Albany County, Wyoming,
613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979), reversing 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975);
Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978) reh. den. 587 P.2d
203 (Wyo. 1978). Williams v. Eaton, supa note 59.
108. See Antieu, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 29 et. seq. (1971 & Supp.) ; DAviS
supra note 7, § 25.00 & 26.00 et. seq. (Supp. 1976 & 1980); Note, 14 LAND &
WATEa L. REV. 281 (1979); Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977); McCormack & Kirkpatrick,
Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8 RuT.-CA . L. REV. 65
(1978). See also, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See Johnson v.
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Unlike the traditional tort immunity afforded public
employees when their government is immune,"0 9 under section 1983 the immunity of the government and the employee
are not co-extensive. The state is absolutely immune from
section 1983 actions. This immunity is based upon the
eleventh amendment.' and it has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in the recent case of Quern v.
Jordan."' Although the state is immune, local governments
are not. The United States Supreme Court's holding in
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services"'
established that municipalities are persons who can be held
liable under section 1983.
The GCA makes no mention of section 1983 actions.
This omission could be interpreted to mean that the legislature intends public employees to be immune from such
suits. The argument would be made that section 1983 actions
do not fit within the enumerated exceptions, that they are
not tort actions that result in bodily injury, wrongful
death and property damage, and that therefore the government and its employees are immune. Such an argument,
however, ignores established law. Section 1983 was created
to protect rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and even though state courts have concurrent juris-

109.
110.

111.
112.

Herschler, No. C78-217k (U.S.D.C. Wyo.), summary judgment entered March
6, 1980 sustaining Governor Herschler's absolute immunity under § 1983 for
acts of a judicial nature, based on Butz v. Economou, supra. It is also
beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the development of constitutional torts. The seminal case is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The most recent
99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979).
development is Davis v. Passmam ........ U.S-.
See also Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. den.
439 U.S. 1048 (1979) (refusing to extend the Biven's doctrine to make
municipalities liable for police actions). See the extensive discussion in
DAviS, supra note 7, § 26.00-0 et. seq. (Supp. 1980).
See Osborn v. Lawson, supra note 82.
The eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
; 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979). See also Edgar v. State, 92 Wash.
U.S.
2d 217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979) cert. den. 100 S.Ct. 1026 (1980); Korgich v.
Regents of New Mexico School of Mines 582 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1978).
436 U.S. 658 (1978). The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a
municipality does not have a qualified immunity from liability under 42
U.S.C. 1983 and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense
, 48
U.S..
to such liability. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,
U.S.L.W. 4389 (Decided April 16, 1980). See Note, supra note 108.
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cannot create
diction over section 1983.. actions, "states
'11 4
Acts."
Rights
Civil
Federal
defenses to the
Although not entitled to absolute immunity, public
employees are granted a qualified good-faith immunity.
This qualified immunity is based upon the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Wood v. Strickland."5 As set
forth by the Wyoming Supreme Court, this immunity is
available to the public employee if he can demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(1) That he acted without malicious intention to
deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights or
cause him to suffer other injury, and
(2) That he did not know and reasonably need
not have known that his conduct violated the constitutional rights of the party affected." 6
To understand the predicament of a public employee
sued in a section 1983 action, assume the following facts.
A social worker employed by the state Department of Public
Assistance and Social Services takes a child suspected of
being abused into protective custody under circumstances
that give rise to a colorable section 1983 claim." 7 Assume
that the state, the agency head and the social worker are
named as defendants in a section 1983 suit by the parents.
Once the complaint is filed the state will have to choose
how to defend the action. The state could rest its defense
solely on the eleventh amendment and seek to have itself
Board of Trustees v. Holso, supra note 107.
Antieu, supra note 108, at 111. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287,
290 (7th Cir. 1968); Hampton v. City of Chicago, Cook County, Ill. 484
F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 415 U.S. 917 (1979); Martinez,
supra note 53, at 553-554.
115. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
116. Board of Trustees v. Holso, supra, note 107 at 1019. The Holso test is
slightly different from the standard in Wood v. Strickland, supra note 115.
The Wood test is stated to make the school board member "not immune
. . . if he knew or reasonably should have known." 420 U.S. at 320. The
Wood test is also stated in terms of a "disregard of settled, undisputable
law." Id.
117. For example, a law enforcement officer (note that this term is undefined)
could take a neglected child into protective custody under the provisions
of WYO. STAT. § 14-6-205 (1977), and deposit the child with the Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS). DPASS could
then fail to hold the shelter care hearing within 72 hours, as required by
WYO. STAT. § 14-6-209 (1977).
113.
114.
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dismissed from the suit.'18 The defense is based on the
argument that the GCA does not apply to section 1983
actions because they are not "tort" actions and therefore
the state has no obligation to defend or indemnify its employees. This argument places the burden of liability
directly and solely upon the public employees.
A second option for the state is to again defend on
the eleventh amendment, but the Attorney General could
decide as a matter of policy that the state should defend
state employees no matter what kind of suit is brought.
This policy would not involve a consideration of the GCA
but would be merely an executive decision to provide a
defense to state employees. This approach would not place
any obligation upon the state to indemnify.
A third approach that the state could take to defending
the action is based on an interpretation of section 1-39-104
(b) of the Wyoming Statutes.119 Note that this section
obligates the government to provide a defense when "liability"
is alleged. The section can be read in two ways. The state
118. The eleventh amendment immunity only applies to the state and cannot
shield the public employee. See Edgar v. State, supra note 111.
The 1980 Legislature clarified one aspect of the state's responsibility
to provide a defense. The legislature enacted Wyo. STAT. § 9-2-518, 1980
Wyo. SESs. LAWS. Ch. 7, which obligates the attorney general to provide
a defense to any state official (agency head or elected state executive
officer) who is sued in a civil suit not involving a tort action governed
by Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-104 (Supp. 1979). In the hypothetical, the state
would defend the agency head, but the social worker would be left to hire
private counsel.
WYO. STAT. § 9-2-518 (1980) is directed at § 1983 suits and is a clear
indication that the legislature does not believe that the GCA covers civil
rights actions. Section 9-2-518 is a very curious statute. When it was
originally proposed the act was limited to providing a defense to state
officials who were sued by state employees. 1980 LEG. H.B. 12. This was
presumably intended to cover § 1983 actions brought by disgruntled state
employees against their superiors. See Atchison v. Nelson, No. C79-205B
(U.S.D.C. Wyo.). However, as finally enacted the limitation to suits by
state employees was removed.
Section 9-2-518(b) (1980) requires the state official to reimburse the
state if it is determined that the official acted outside the "scope of his
employment." The legislature could have used the term "scope of duties"
from the GCA but did not. Presumably the two phrases are synonymous.
The GCA says nothing about reimbursement of the governmental entity
in a tort action. A public employee sued under one of the exceptions in
the GCA could be found to have acted maliciously and fraudulently, but
if the employee was acting within the scope of his duties there is no
reimbursement requirement. The legislature could have followed, but did
not, New Mexico's statute which requires any public employee to reimburse
the government if it is determined that the employee acted maliciously or
fraudulently. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(D) (Supp. 1979).
119. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-104(b) (Supp. 1979).
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could argue that the term "liability" should be limited to
allegations of "tort liability" and interpreted in conjunction
with section 1-39-104(a)12 which limits immunity to torts.
Because section 1983 actions are not traditional tort suits,
the GCA does not, under this argument, require the state
to defend. The public employee will counter by arguing that
if the legislature had wanted to limit the obligation to
defend to torts it could have said "tort liability".' 2 ' The
absence of the modifier indicates an intention to obligate
the government to provide a defense no matter what kind
of action is brought, be it tort, contract or civil rights.
If, as is probable, the employees succeed in requiring
the state to provide a defense, they will try to assert that
the GCA requires indemnification. This is a much more
difficult argument because the indemnification obligation
is limited to "tort claim or judgment".' 2 Again, because
section 1983 suits are not tort actions, the state has no
indemnification obligation. The state's argument against
indemnification is buttressed by the Wyoming Legislature's
enactment in 1980 of section 9-2-518 which requires the
attorney general to provide defense for state officers but
does not mention indemnification. 2 ' The indemnification
issue will be difficult for a court because of the compelling
equities on the side of the employees, but the legislative
intent to preclude indemnification is fairly clear.'24
A law enforcement officer may be in a more fortunate
position than other public employees in that a section 1983
suit may fall within the exception under section 1-39-112
of the Wyoming Statutes.'25 All that is required is proof
of damages resulting from tortious conduct. If the officer
was acting within the scope of his duties (probably a hotly
120. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) (Supp. 1979).
121. The public employee will certainly also argue that the definition of tort
in Wyoming, supra note 62 is broad enough to include a § 1983 action.
122. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(b) (Supp. 1979).
123. 1980 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 7, supra note 118.
124. Note the California Supreme Court's Decision in Williams v. Howath,
supra note 57, where the court made California's indemnification provision
applicable to § 1983 actions. Although the California Tort Claims Act
required imdemnification for "any" claims, the court's reasoning for applying the provision to § 1983 actions is compelling. Id. at 1131-1134.
125. Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-112 (Supp. 1979).
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contested issue) and the action is one sounding in tort, he
should be indemnified.
It is a question of policy whether the government
should indemnify its employees. As the GCA is now written,
a public employee who is not a law enforcement officer is
personally liable for section 1983 actions unless shielded by
the qualified good-faith immunity. Given the central thrust
of the GCA, which is to make the governmental entity bear
the burden of government-caused injuries, it seems inequitable to place the potentially extensive liability of section
1983 actions on the employees' shoulders. Indeed, because
of the nature of the section 1983 action, those officials with
the greatest potential exposure are the top administrative
and elective officials in the government.
However, the most persuasive criticism of the GCA's
failure to indemnify its employees for section 1983 actions
is that it will result in very arbitrary court judgments. The
GCA's denial of indemnity turns on the meaning of "tort".
Tort has never been amenable to very precise definitions
and the development of constitutional torts has further
complicated definitional efforts. While it is true that some
section 1983 actions are not related to common law notions
of tort,... many section 1983 suits could be brought as tort
actions. For example, suits that could state claims against
the police for wrongful death, false imprisonment, or assault
and battery12 have been successfully prosecuted as section
1983 actions. What the GCA does is to vest in the plaintiff
the power to determine, by the kind of action that he brings,
whether the employee will be indemnified by the government.
It is unfortunate that the legislature has conferred such
power upon plaintiffs to affect the personal fortunes of
public employees. 2 '
It would be very simple for the legislature to extend
indemnification to public employees for section 1983 actions.
126. See Williams v. Horvath, supra note 57, at 1129 n. 2.
127. Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. den. 439 U.S. 912
(1978) (wrongful death); Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th
Cir. 1979) (false imprisonment); Williams v. Horvath, supra note 57
(assault and battery).
128. See DAVIS, supra note 7, § 26.07 (Supp. 1980).
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For example, Oregon accomplishes this by defining the word
"tort" to include "any violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983."1'9
Such a change is desirable and the legislature would promote fairness and ease the minds of a great number of
public employees if this amendment were made.
One other issue that affects public employee liability
and that requires legislative change should be noted. It is
not clear whether the GCA would protect a person who had
left government service from a suit brought for actions
taken while he was a public employee. Such a circumstance
may not be uncommon. Again, the legislature should consult the New Mexico statute' for language that extends
the government's obligation to pay a settlement or claim
to a former employee when liability is imposed for actions
taken within the scope of his duties while employed.
Claims Procedure
The GCA requires that claims brought under the act
be presented to the governmental entity within two years
of the date of occurrence.' This is an exceedingly generous
time period, the limit in other states being as short as 90 2or 180... days. The notice of claims statutes have been
upheld by the Wyoming courts and this claims requirement
is certainly constitutional.'
Statute of Limitations
The general statute of limitations in the GCA provides
that actions must be commenced within one year after the
129. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265(1) (1977). See also the language in the New
Mexico statute. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(B) (2) (Supp. 1979).
130. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(G) (Supp. 1979).
131. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-113 (Supp. 1979).
132. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (1978).
133. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 8107 (1964).
134. Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra note 14. See Note, 14 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 259 (1979); see also Comment, Idaho Tort Claims Act: Nature of
Claims, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 190 (1975). Note that for actions not falling
within the GCA the claims period is one (1) year. Wyo. STAT. § 9-2-332
(Supp. 1979). It can be expected that a plaintiff who is barred by an
untimely filing under § 9-2-332 will try to make his action sound in tort
in order to take advantage of the longer claim period under the GCA.
The plaintiff may also challenge the shorter statute on equal protection
grounds. See note 140, infra and Comment, Idaho Tort Claims Act: Notice
of Claims, supra.
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date the notice of claim is filed under section 1-39-113.35
Counting the two year notice period, litigants have a total
of three years in which to file suit under the GCA. By
contrast, the limitation on actions not under the GCA are
four (4) years for injury to the rights of the plaintiff,
not arising under contract, 8 ' and one (1) year in an action
for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution
or false imprisonment.' 7
The GCA, then, makes a significant change in the
limitations period for suits against governments. For actions
for bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage under
the GCA, the limitation period is one year shorter than
corresponding suits against private parties. However, for
suits against law enforcement officers under section 1-39112,18 the GCA provides an additional two years for claims
based on libel, slander, etc.
It is a general rule that the enactment of statutes of
limitation is within the sound discretion of the legislature
and courts are generally reluctant to interfere unless there
is manifest injustice. The legislature is free to shorten or
lengthen statutes of limitation and it can single out select
classes of action for special treatment." 9 Given the power
of the legislature to determine statutes of limitation, a
constitutional challenge, probably based on equal protection
grounds, should be unsuccessful. 4 '
Other Provisions
Section 1-39-1151' provides for the settlement of claims
by the state. Presumably, the legislature intended that local
WYO. STAT. § 1-39-114 (Supp. 1979).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a) (iv) (C) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105(a) (v) (A-C) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-112 (Supp. 1979).
51 AM. JuR. 2d Limitations of Actions § 37-40 (1972). Note the special
two year limitation given to suits against physicians in Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-3-107 (1977).
140. The challenge would be similar to one made against a notice of claim
statute, that the act establishes classes of litigants without their being
a rational relationship between the classification (State v. Private) and
the statutory purpose. See Comment, Idaho Tort Claims Act; Notice of
Claims, supra note 133. Note that the statute of limitations on § 1983
actions is two years, under Wyoming law. Spiegel v. School Dist. No. 1,
Laramie County, 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979).
141. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-115 (Supp. 1979).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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governments be free to set up their own claims settlement
procedures. The section gives the Attorney General 120
days in which to settle the claim. That may be too short a
period in which to adequately investigate the claim and
determine if the claimant might be entitled to judgment.
Section 1-39-1184 ' limits the liability of the governmental entity to $500,000 for all. claims arising out of a
single transaction or occurrence. Compared with other
states, this is a generous limitation. Subsection (b) authorizes the purchase of insurance by the governmental entity
to cover all or any portion of the risk. Additionally, the
insurance can exceed the risk limits and cover areas outside the scope of the GCA. However, given the likely constitutionality of the GCA and its limits of recovery, a governmental entity has little reason to acquire more extensive
coverage, and premiums paid for such coverage might
constitute waste of governmental resources.14
A troublesome problem on the limitation of liability
has been raised recently by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Nevada v. Hall."' In that case, the court
approved a California decision that permitted a California
plaintiff to obtain judgment against the State of Nevada
for injuries resulting from an accident occurring in California with a University of Nevada vehicle. Nevada argued
unsuccessfully that recovery should be limited to the amount
specified in the Nevada Tort Claims Statute. The court
held, inter alia, that the full faith and credit clause... does
not require a state to apply another state's law in violation
of its own legitimate public policy. As a result of this
decision, the $500,000 limitation in the GCA may not_ protect the government for injuries caused by a public employee
while traveling in another state on public business. The
legislature will have to weigh the need for additional
coverage to address this problem.
142. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-118 (Supp. 1979). See also Annot., 71 .A.L.R.3d 90
(1976).
143. The plaintiff should check any- insurance policy. carefully because the
requires. For example,
GCA
the
than
coverage may in fact be broader
some personal liability policies expressly cover § 1983 actions.
144. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
145. UNITED STATES CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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Finally, section 1-39-118' provides that no judgment
shall include an award for exemplary or punitive damages,""
for interest prior to judgment, or for attorney fees. The
statute may not, however, prevent an award of attorney
fees in civil rights cases. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee
Act'4 8 permits the judge in his discretion to award attorney
fees for a successful civil rights claim. The same policy
reasons that do not permit states to create defenses to civil
rights actions are invoked to avoid the limitation on the
149
award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION

The GCA is a complex act and it will take many years
and several court cases before the intricacies are fully
illuminated. However, this much can be said now. The GCA
is a landmark piece of legislation in Wyoming and it goes
far to "balance the respective equities" between governments and the individual. Wyoming governments are now
liable for a wide variety of activities and plaintiffs no longer
have to struggle against the inequities of the doctrine that
the "King can do no wrong".
As with any statute, the need for legislative amendment
will become apparent with time. However, there are changes
that the legislature should consider at its earliest opportunity.
The state should indemnify public employees who are sued
under the civil right acts. Such indemnity is well justified,
has been adopted by the majority of neighboring states,
and involves a very simple amendment. The legislature
should also clarify its intent as to the retention of the
governmental/proprietary and discretionary/ministerial categories as defenses for local governments. Hopefully, the
legislature will bury these relics once and for all.
Lawrence J. Wolfe
146. WYo. STAT. § 1-39-118 (Supp. 1979).
147. See Frick v. Abel, 602 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1979) for a case under the Colorado
Tort Claims Act where the individual police officer was required to pay
the exemplary damages.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
149. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), holding that a fee award under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not barred by the eleventh amendment; see also
Ferdinand v. City of Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122 (Alaska 1979); Board of
Trustees v. Holso, supra, note 107.
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